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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
Reynaldo Reyes appeals the District Court’s denial of 
his motion to certify a class to sue for alleged civil violations 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d).  The defendants are 
Zions First National Bank (“Zions Bank”) and its payment-
processor subsidiaries, Netdeposit, LLC and MP 
Technologies (together, “Modern Payments”). 
 
Reyes alleges that the defendants conspired to conduct 
a fraudulent telemarketing scheme that caused unauthorized 
debits from bank accounts owned by himself and members of 
the proposed class. 
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The District Court held that class certification was 
inappropriate because there were no issues common to the 
class and Reyes could therefore satisfy neither the 
commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a), nor the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  
This interlocutory appeal followed.1 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Reyes alleges that the defendants conspired to conduct 
a fraudulent scheme whereby certain telemarketing firms 
would contact unsuspecting individuals and offer them 
something of little or no value.  Reyes alleges that, during 
unsolicited phone calls with unsuspecting consumers, the 
telemarketers would obtain bank account information which 
was used to make unauthorized debits from the the 
consumers’ bank accounts.2  In Reyes’ case, in an unsolicited 
phone call in November 2007, telemarketer NHS Systems 
told Reyes that he qualified for a free government grant.  
NHS Systems then requested Reyes’ bank account 
information, which he provided. 
 
Telemarketers such as NHS Systems cannot readily 
obtain funds directly from consumers’ bank accounts because 
most banks are extremely reluctant to allow them to debit 
accounts.  Accordingly, telemarketers usually contract with 
payment processing entities that debit bank accounts on the 
                                              
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  The 
District Court also granted various amici curiae leave to file 
briefs in support of Reyes’ motion for class certification. 
 
2 Reyes alleges that, besides phone-based marketing, 
the scheme included deceptive mailers, Internet solicitation, 
and “slamming,” a process whereby a telemarketer acquires a 
consumer’s bank account information from another entity and 
either contacts the consumer under the pretense of attempting 
to verify the information or simply transfers money from the 
consumer’s account.  JA 513-15. 
Because Reyes alleges that the merchants operated in 
the same way and as part of a fraudulent enterprise, Appellant 
Br. at 18, we refer to all of them as “telemarketers” for the 
sake of simplicity. 
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telemarketer’s behalf.  In Reyes’ case, NHS Systems did 
exactly that.  It provided Reyes’ bank account information to 
Modern Payments, a third-party payment processing agency 
and subsidiary of Zions Bank.  Modern Payments then caused 
Zions Bank to initiate an Automated Clearing House 
(“ACH”) debit of Reyes’ bank account at Commerce Bank.  
Pursuant to Zions Bank’s request, Reyes’ funds on deposit 
with Commerce Bank were transferred to Modern Payments’ 
account at Zions Bank, and ultimately transferred to NHS 
Systems, the Originator.  Two debits were processed from 
Reyes’ account using this ACH debit process, one for $29.95 
and another for $299.95.3  Reyes v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, --- 
F. Supp. 2d ---, Civ. Action No. 10-345, 2013 WL 5332107, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013). 
 
The ACH debit process is an alternative to traditional 
checking which is based on the transfer of paper instruments.  
When an ACH transfer occurs, an Originating Depository 
Financial Institution, like Zions Bank, initiates an ACH entry 
at the request of an Originator (such as NHS Systems).  Such 
requests can also be made through third parties at the request 
of the Originator.  As we have just explained, Reyes alleges 
that Modern Payments caused Zions Bank to take ACH debits 
from bank accounts owned by him and other members of the 
putative class at the request of the telemarketers, like NHS 
Systems. 
 
The Originating Depository Financial Institution (here, 
Zions Bank) aggregates payments from customers and 
transmits the payments in batches to an ACH Operator (either 
the Federal Reserve or the Clearing House).  The Operator 
receives and sorts the batched payments and makes the funds 
available to the Receiving Depository Financial Institution.  
That institution, in turn, debits or credits the relevant account 
based on the ACH entry.  Here, Reyes alleges that Modern 
                                              
3 Although many (if not all) of the debits involved in 
this appeal are sufficiently small to be considered de minimis 
by some, the cumulative amount is substantial.  In fact, the 
conduct alleged here has attracted the attention of the 
impressive array of amici who have filed briefs in this matter, 
including the AARP, four members of the United States 
Congress, and the American Bankers Association. 
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Payments credited the accounts of each of the telemarketers 
in the amount of funds fraudulently debited from 
unsuspecting victims.  Both Modern Payments, as payment 
processor, and Zions Bank, as the processor’s bank, would 
have collected a fee and then deposited the balance of 
amounts debited from consumers directly into the account of 
the telemarketer.4 
 
Reyes alleges that his bank account and the accounts 
of other consumers subjected to this fraudulent enterprise did 
not have sufficient funds to satisfy many of the unauthorized 
debits.5  Reyes called NHS Systems to complain about the 
two withdrawals from his account, but he alleges NHS 
Systems provided him with a misleading audio recording.6   
 
Thereafter, Reyes initiated this action on behalf of 
himself and a class of all individuals in the United States as to 
whom ACH debit entries or [remotely created check] drafts 
on their accounts were prepared by defendants Netdeposit, 
Modern Payments, or Teledraft during the four-year period 
immediately preceding the filing of this action and finally 
charged to the class members’ bank accounts by a 
Telemarketer, or pursuant to information provided to 
defendants [Netdeposit, Modern Payments, or Teledraft] by 
                                              
4 Though this sounds cumbersome, it is nothing more 
than a series of computer entries or lines of computer code; 
the entire series of transactions can easily be completed, and 
the funds transferred and received, in one to two business 
days. 
 
5 It is not difficult to understand why the accounts did 
not have a sufficient balance to pay the amount of the 
attempted debits.  If the depositors had never authorized the 
debits, they would have had no way of knowing that the 
balance in their accounts was not sufficient to satisfy the 
amounts of the attempted withdrawals and no reason to take 
steps to ensure that their balances were sufficient to cover 
those debits. 
 
6 According to NHS Systems, the recording 
established that Reyes consented to the disputed debits. 
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the Telemarketers, or who otherwise incurred any bank 
charges as a consequence of such ACH debit entries or 
[remotely-created checks]. 
 
JA 526 ¶ 63. 
 
The legal theory underlying this suit is that the 
defendants were operating a RICO enterprise that was a total 
sham.7  The proof that Reyes offers to support that claim 
includes the inordinately high “return rates” of the 
telemarketers who did business with Modern Payments and 
Zions Bank.  “Return rates” refer to how often an ACH debit 
cannot be completed.  There are many reasons why a 
transaction may not be completed.  These include (but are not 
limited to) insufficient funds or a customer complaint 
regarding the transaction.  These complaints can result in the 
debited funds being credited back to the consumer’s bank 
account.  Return rates are collected by NACHA (previously 
known as the “National Automated Clearing House 
Association”), a not-for-profit association that administers 
and manages the ACH Network and other electronic 
transactions. 
 
Reyes stresses that “the lowest return rate at issue 
[here] was 25 times the national average of 1.25%.”  
Appellant Br. at 26 (emphasis in original).  Moreover, that 
was the telemarketer with the lowest rate.  As Reyes notes, he 
produced testimony that “[m]ost were over 50 times that 
average.”  Id. at 25-26 (citing JA 661, 663).  According to 
Reyes, the high return rates establish that Zions Bank and 
Modern Payments had reason to know that the telemarketers 
were engaged in fraudulent conduct. 
 
Reyes produced additional evidence to support his 
argument.  That evidence included internal e-mails wherein 
Zions Bank, Netdeposit, and Modern Payments discussed the 
                                              
7 As noted, Reyes alleges that this fraudulent scheme 
constituted an “enterprise” under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  
However, since the only issue before us is the District Court’s 
refusal to certify a class under Rule 23, we need not discuss 
the elements needed to prove a RICO conspiracy except 
insofar as they may bear upon issues of class certification. 
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“staggering” return rates, JA 686, and the “alarm” that their 
high return rates had caused NACHA.  Id. at 814-15.  
According to Reyes, “[w]ithin the first three months of 
opening Modern Payments, for example, Zions was notified 
of the likelihood of fraud by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), NACHA, and its own officers.”  Appellant Br. at 
28.  There was also evidence that these defendants 
communicated concern that they may be at risk for some of 
their business lines being used for money laundering.  JA 
692. 
 
Reyes claims the evidence establishes that “[e]ach of 
the[] frauds operated in the same way, luring consumers with 
some kind of ‘card’ or ‘benefit’ to obtain their bank account 
information.”  Appellant Br. at 18.8  These included 
“promises of un-secured loans, pre-paid credit cards, 
merchandise-club cards, identity-theft protection plans, and 
health-care discount plans.”  Meyer Decl., JA 1639-40 ¶ 19.  
Thus, although there is some variation in the “benefits” 
offered and the particular way each fraud was perpetrated, 
Reyes asserts that there is no need to examine each individual 
transaction “[b]ecause the business model of these schemes is 
inherently fraudulent[.]”  Appellant Br. at 19. 
 
A. REYES’ EXPERT WITNESSES 
 
Reyes offered several witnesses at the hearing on class 
certification, including three experts.  Amelia H. Boss, a 
Drexel Law School Professor, testified as an expert on 
banking and banking practices.  Robert J. Meyer, a Wharton 
Business School Professor, and Barbara A. Blake, a former 
investigator for the Iowa Attorney General, both testified as 
experts on fraudulent marketing practices.  Although we refer 
                                              
8 Reyes also cites numerous proceedings against some 
of the telemarketers involving the FTC and other entities that 
led to conclusions that the telemarketers were engaged in 
fraud.  See Appellant Br. at 4, 16, 20-21.  The defendants 
point out, and Reyes does not dispute, that the government 
enforcement actions involving the telemarketers in this case 
were initiated after the defendants stopped doing business 
with them, and the defendants were not themselves parties to 
any of those actions.  Appellee Br. 49. 
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to their testimony throughout our discussion, it is helpful to 
provide an initial summary of the testimony of each. 
 
1. Amelia H. Boss 
 
Professor Amelia Boss repeatedly highlighted “the 
excessively high rates of returns generated by Modern 
Payments and its clients, of which Zions was well aware,” 
and asserted that the rates provided clear evidence of 
fraudulent activity.  Boss Decl., JA 582-92 ¶¶ 66-87.  
According to Professor Boss, most “banks never (or rarely) 
have debits returned as ‘unauthorized.’”  Id., JA 582 ¶ 66.  
Indeed, Zions Bank did not have any unauthorized returns 
until it began working with Modern Payments.  Boss pointed 
out that when Modern Payments and Zions Bank began 
working together in September 2006, the “number of 
unauthorized returns immediately began to increase 
dramatically from zero . . . to 799” in two months, and up to 
2,632 unauthorized returns by February of the following year.  
Id., JA 587-88 ¶ 78 (emphasis in original).  According to 
Professor Boss, when adjusted for size, Zions Bank had the 
worst return rate of any bank in the country.  Id. 
 
Professor Boss also testified that Zions Bank had 
numerous NACHA violations, knew that many of its 
customers were high risk, and yet it completed inadequate 
due diligence.  Id., JA 587 ¶ 77.  She explained that NACHA 
“prohibits the use of the ACH system for telemarking 
payments initiated by outbound telemarketing.”  Id., JA 575 ¶ 
46.9  NACHA imposed this prohibition because it recognized 
that telemarketers have a high likelihood of fraud.  Id., JA 
575 ¶ 46. 
 
NACHA requires that transmission of debit and credit 
entries and entry of data over the ACH Network be entered 
with an appropriate label or code.  Id., JA 561-63 ¶¶ 15-16, 
                                              
9 See also Appellant Br. at 11-12 (discussing “rules 
that prohibit banks from entering transactions derived from 
outbound telemarketing (i.e., the type of cold-calling that Mr. 
Reyes experienced).”) (citing JA 672 (2008 ACH Rules, 
NACHA, Subsection 14.1.63)); Boss Decl., JA 597-601 ¶¶ 
98-107. 
 10 
 
18.  For instance, transactions originating on the Internet, like 
those from the allegedly fraudulent Internet merchants here, 
are labeled “WEB,” while certain telephone-initiated debits, 
like those from telemarketers, are labeled “TEL.”  Id., JA 
562-63 ¶ 18.  According to Professor Boss, Zions Bank and 
Modern Payments failed to adhere to this policy because 
Modern Payments often labeled TEL or WEB transactions as 
“PPD” transactions.  “PPD” refers to transactions that are 
“obtained in pre-existing, signed writings.”  Id., JA 597-98 ¶ 
99.  They are, therefore, the safest category of transaction.  
Mislabeling made it appear that the consumer had actually 
authorized his or her bank account to be debited even though 
there were no such written agreements.  
 
 “Zions knew that th[ese] representation[s] w[ere] 
false.”  Id., JA 597-98 ¶ 99.  Yet, “[d]espite being advised of 
[its] use of improper codes[,] Zions continued to attach the 
false codes and continued to misrepresent the warranties.”  
Id., JA 598 ¶ 101.  According to Reyes, the mislabeling made 
it possible to “hid[e] . . . the true source of the debits[]” “from 
victims’ banks and regulators[.]”  Appellant Br. at 30 (citing 
Boss Decl., JA 597-99 ¶¶ 98-102).  If accepted by a 
factfinder, this testimony could obviously establish that the 
PPD code was used to conceal the true nature of these 
transactions.  Accordingly, Professor Boss concluded that 
Zions Bank 
 
knowingly allowed the system to be used by 
High Risk originators[, like Modern Payments,] 
whom it had to know were engaged in fraud in 
clear disregard of the governing rules and 
standards, . . . made knowing 
misrepresentations to the other participants in 
the ACH system (including the consumer 
receivers), . . . facilitated the misuse of the 
system by Modern Payments and its customers, 
and . . . did all this knowing of facts from 
which, as a banking institution, it had to know 
fraud was taking place. 
 
Boss Decl., JA 601 ¶ 107. 
 
2. Robert J. Meyer 
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Professor Robert Meyer testified that the Federal 
Reserve Bank has concluded that 10% return rates are prima 
facie evidence of fraud.10  Meyer Decl., JA 1636 ¶ 11.b.  
Here, the return rates “rang[ed] from 30% to almost 90%[.]”  
Id., JA 1636 ¶ 11.a.  In addition, Professor Meyer pointed to 
FTC enforcement actions and these telemarketers’ products 
and services to conclude that the telemarketers operated 
“schemes designed to obtain victims’ bank account 
information by deception and to use that information to debit 
victims’ accounts as quickly [and] as often as possible before 
the victim understood what had occurred.”  Id., JA 1634-35 
¶¶ 8-9. 
 
According to Professor Meyer, telemarketers 
NHS/PHS, the Platinum Benefit Group, Vexeldale (also 
known as Market Power Marketing Solutions, Sourdale, and 
ZaZoom), RxSmart, Low Pay, and Group One Networks 
offered a variety of products that were either valueless or 
significantly devalued.  Id., JA 1633, 1639-40 ¶¶ 6, 19.   
Although there was some variation in the manner in which 
the unauthorized debits were accomplished, Professor Meyer 
concluded that they had the same components of deception: 
(1) each was obtained from a first party at a small or 
                                              
10 The defendants contest this statement, noting that 
“[t]here is no law or regulation supporting this contention.”  
Appellee Br. at 47 (emphasis in original).  Professor Meyer, 
like Investigator Blake and Reyes, who also refer to the 
Federal Reserve Bank’s prima facie evidence of fraud, fails to 
include a source.  The record presented, however, does 
contain an unrelated complaint quoting an unnamed Federal 
Reserve official as writing that a 10% return rate “would 
likely be regarded by bank supervisory agencies and/or law 
enforcement agencies as prima facie evidence that your bank 
knew or should have known that your [third-party payment 
processors and/or merchants] had engaged in fraudulent 
activities.”  JA 1695 ¶ 64 (alteration in original).  Despite 
whatever dispute the parties have regarding the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s position on return rates, neither party disputes 
that the vast majority of U.S. banks have rates of returns that 
are close to (or actually are) zero, while here, that number is 
30% to 90%. 
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negligible cost; (2) all were used to debit consumer accounts 
for exorbitant amounts, (3) none of these items conveyed any 
net value to the consumers, and (4) all were sufficiently 
complex, initially concealing their fraudulent nature to the 
victim.  Id., JA 1639-40 ¶ 19.  Professor Meyer based his 
opinion on his review of “telephone scripts and web landing 
pages used in the marketing of the products and/or programs, 
internal e[-]mails, and tables of ACH return rates for the 
programs[.]”  Id., JA 1633 ¶ 6. 
 
3. Barbara A. Blake 
 
Reyes’ expert Investigator Barbara Blake examined 
each scheme in detail and also stated that return rates over 
10% were prima facie evidence of fraud.  Blake Decl., JA 
1614-15 ¶ 19.   
 
Investigator Blake looked at the operations of each 
entity and other evidence before concluding that the 
telemarketers operate “fundamentally fraudulent schemes[.]”  
Id., JA 1627-28 ¶ 85.  She noted that the “[h]igh return rates 
are the plainest hallmark of mass-marketing fraud conducted 
through the banking system.  This has been recognized in 
publications of the Comptroller of the Currency, FinCen, 
NACHA and the FDIC.”  Id., JA 1614 ¶ 18. 
 
Investigator Blake concluded that “each of the 
schemes at issue was a totally fraudulent mass-marketing 
fraud” because each of them “uses purported ‘products’ and 
‘services’ that are routinely used as part of mass-marketing 
fraud schemes.”  Id., JA 1613 ¶ 15.  “Th[e] strong 
presumption of fraud [evidenced by the high return rates] is 
confirmed by the nature of the schemes . . . , which, once they 
are understood, are plainly fraudulent on their face.”  Id., JA 
1615 ¶ 21.  Investigator Blake’s conclusion was based on the 
telemarketers’ sales scripts, the worthless nature of the 
purported “products,” and the history of regulatory actions 
taken against the telemarketers and their principals.  Id., JA 
1613-27 ¶¶ 15-84. 
 
B. FACT WITNESSES 
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The District Court also heard the testimony of two fact 
witnesses whose testimony will be discussed in greater detail 
below.11  They were: Wayne D. Geisser, who was installed as 
the NHS Systems receiver after the FTC obtained a 
preliminary injunction against NHS Systems, and Jeanette A. 
Fox, who was a senior director of risk investigation at 
NACHA.  Appellant Br. at 12, 26.  Geisser and Fox testified 
that high return rates are not dispositive of fraud.  Fox Dep., 
JA 2987-2991; Geisser Dep., JA 1155, 3055.  Fox explained 
that an unauthorized return could be the result of a dispute 
over an agreement, the amount charged, or the timing of the 
charge.  Fox Dep., JA 2975.  Nevertheless, Fox did believe 
that the rate of returns here was high enough to warrant an 
investigation.  Id., JA 1145.   Even she agreed that the rates 
strongly suggested fraud.  Id., JA 2977 (stating there is 
“[p]robably not” a legitimate reason for excessive return 
rates).  Geisser testified that the NHS Systems health discount 
program brochures, fulfillment packages, purchase orders, 
and contracts with call centers appeared to be legitimate, 
Geisser Dep., JA 3049-50, even though he agreed that NHS 
Systems was totally fraudulent.  Id., JA 1161. 
 
C. DEFENDANTS’ EXPERT WITNESSES 
 
The defendants presented two experts: Kathleen O. 
Milner, an expert in the ACH Network and NACHA rules and 
guidance, who worked for many years in private financial 
services, and Peter G. Djinis, a lawyer who specializes in 
compliance concerning federal anti-money laundering and 
Bank Secrecy Act laws and regulations with experience in the 
Department of the Treasury. 
 
1. Kathleen O. Milner 
 
Kathleen Milner provided an overview of the ACH 
system and NACHA.  She explained that, although “NACHA 
Operating Rules are contractually binding on parties to ACH 
payments,” like the NACHA Operating Guidelines, they do 
not “have the force of law[.]”  Milner Decl., JA 3781-82 ¶ 11.  
 
                                              
11 Fox and Geisser were called by plaintiff’s counsel as 
“fact witnesses.”  JA 2696; Fox Decl., JA 2972. 
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Milner also discussed high return rates, noting that 
high returns rates “may be indicative of fraud,” but believed 
that they are not “conclusive evidence of fraud.”  Id., JA 3784 
¶ 17.  In support of this assertion, Milner summarized various 
return codes that are used to identify transactions that are not 
properly authorized, highlighting the ones used in this case 
that are not dispositive of fraud.  Id., JA 3785-89 ¶¶ 20-29.  
She believed that, “without investigating the facts and 
circumstances of each purported fraudulent transaction, you 
are left simply with conjecture[]” about whether fraud is 
involved.  Id., JA 3789 ¶ 29.  She also testified that, “[t]o 
conclude that the merchants were in fact complete frauds and 
to further conclude that the Zions Defendants knew them to 
be so would require an individualized analysis of each 
merchant and the Zions Defendants’ relationship with each 
merchant.”  Id. 
 
Milner rejected Reyes’ assertion that the mislabeled 
codes (labeling “TEL” and “WEB” transactions as “PPD” 
transactions) indicate fraud.  Rather, she concluded that the 
mislabeled classifications were the result of a problem with 
Modern Payments’ software.  Id., JA 3791 ¶ 33.  According 
to Milner, using the TEL code liberally, not solely when there 
was a preexisting relationship or consumer-initiated call was 
not fraud, but due, in part, to the fact that “the requirements of 
the TEL rule were broken up throughout the NACHA 
rulebook and were, therefore, difficult to locate and confusing 
to follow.”  Id., JA 3794-95 ¶ 39.  
 
Finally, Milner asserted that charging a fee for 
returned transactions was also not indicative of fraud because 
it is “accepted industry practice” to do so “as a disincentive 
for Originators having returned transactions and an incentive 
to obtain proper authorizations.”  Id., JA 3795 ¶ 40. 
 
2. Peter G. Djinis 
 
Peter Djinis discussed various laws and regulations not 
at issue here, including Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency bulletins, the Bank Secrecy Act, and the U.S. 
Patriot Act, Djinis Decl., JA 3767-70 ¶¶ 13, 16, 18-20, since 
Reyes alleges a RICO violation.  Djinis also opined that 
Modern Payments and Zions Bank conducted adequate due 
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diligence of the telemarketers at issue.  Id., JA 3772-76, ¶¶ 
25-36. 
 
D. REYES’ USE OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
Reyes relies on this record to allege that the defendants 
operated a RICO enterprise that was a “complete sham” 
lacking any legitimate business substance.  He draws upon 
this theory to overcome potential challenges to the 
predominance requirement for class certification.  Under the 
“complete sham” theory, the reviewing court can focus on the 
defendant’s or defendants’ conduct as a whole in order to find 
proof of elements that normally require evidence about each 
plaintiff, like plaintiff’s reliance.  Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 
F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1992); Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 
188 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also In re Cmty. Bank of 
N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., --- F.3d ---, Civ. 
Action No. 13-4273, 2015 WL 4547042, at *19, *21 (3d Cir. 
July 29, 2015).  “[T]he causation element of fraud and breach 
of contract can be satisfied through objective circumstantial 
evidence on a classwide basis.”  Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Trends 
and Developments in the Filing, Certification, Settlement, 
Trial and Appeal of Class Actions, SE99 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 743, 
821 (2000) (“[I]t is unnecessary and unfair to impose 
modalities of proof that are specific to such nonexistent 
personal relationships to insulate defendants from classwide 
liability to those with whom they related on a classwide 
basis.”). 
 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RESOLUTION OF 
REYES’ LEGAL THEORY 
 
The District Court acknowledged the “complete sham” 
theory, explaining that in order for Reyes to succeed on this 
theory under Rule 23, he must demonstrate that the 
“defendant’s conduct is so wrought with fraud as to be a 
complete sham[.]”  Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *6.  Thus, 
the District Court realized that, in an appropriate case, “the 
class members’ participation or involvement with the 
defendant is sufficient evidence that each class member 
suffered damages, rendering an analysis of individual 
transactions unnecessary.”  Id.  As the District Court also 
recognized, pursuant to the “complete sham” theory, 
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misrepresentations by the defendant resulting in the plaintiffs 
experiencing common damages can prove common injury in 
a RICO class action.  Id. (citing Cullen, 188 F.R.D. at 235).12  
In fact, the District Court even went so far (with some 
justification) as to compare this to the “fraud on the market” 
theory.  Id. (citing Lester v. Percudani, 217 F.R.D. 345, 352 
(M.D. Pa. 2003).13   
 
However, the District Court concluded that class 
treatment was inappropriate here because Zions Bank and 
Modern Payments collaborated with separate mass-marketing 
firms and did so in different ways.  The District Court 
                                              
12 As discussed further below, the Supreme Court has 
held that predominance requires that plaintiffs show that their 
individual injuries are capable of proof at trial through 
common evidence and that their damages are measurable on a 
classwide basis. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 
1430, 1432-33 (2013); but see In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 
777 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2015) (“But it is well-established that 
the individuation of damages in consumer class actions is 
rarely determinative under Rule 23(b)(3).  Where common 
questions predominate regarding liability, then courts 
generally find the predominance requirement to be satisfied 
even if individual damages issues remain.” (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citation omitted)). 
 
13 The fraud on the market theory is based on 
the hypothesis that, in an open and developed 
securities market, the price of a company’s 
stock is determined by the available material 
information regarding the company and its 
business.  . . .  Misleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the 
purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.  . . .  The causal connection 
between the defendants’ fraud and the 
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no 
less significant than in a case of direct reliance 
on misrepresentations. 
 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17 
 
stressed that “Reyes almost completely relies on the high 
return rates as his proof of the complete sham, [but] the 
returns are different for each telemarketer, [therefore] he 
cannot prove this complete sham theory on evidence common 
to the class since members of the class interacted with 
different telemarketers.”  Id. at *8.  The District Court also 
emphasized that, although the high return rates were common 
to the telemarketers, they are insufficient to prove fraud. 
 
With this background as our analytical compass, we 
will now discuss class certification within the context of 
Reyes’ claim that he produced sufficient evidence of a sham 
enterprise to satisfy the requirements for class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets out 
requirements for bringing a class action.  All potential classes 
must initially satisfy four prerequisites to be certified: (1) 
numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy 
of representation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  Additional 
requirements must then be satisfied depending on whether a 
plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).  
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Reyes is attempting to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3).  
Accordingly, he must satisfy the additional requirements of 
predominance and superiority.14  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 
                                              
14 When an action proceeds as a class action under 
Rule 23(b)(3), “the court finds that the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). 
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The District Court did not reach all of the prerequisites 
of Rule 23(a) or the superiority requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) 
because it concluded that Reyes had not established 
commonality as required under Rule 23(a) or predominance 
under Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
“Commonality” is a consideration of whether there are 
“questions of law or fact common to the class[.]”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  Commonality is satisfied when there are 
classwide answers.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551-
52; Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 298-300 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (considering “whether the defendant’s 
conduct was common as to all of the class members[]” and 
common questions led to common answers such that the 
“alleged misconduct and the harm it caused would be 
common as to all of the class members[]”). 
 
The predominance inquiry then focuses on whether 
“the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  “Predominance tests 
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation[.]”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Though related, this standard is 
“‘far more demanding’ than the commonality requirement of 
Rule 23(a),” id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997)), and requires “more than a 
common claim.”  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
Reyes seeks to represent a class that may include tens 
of thousands of claimants with potential civil RICO claims 
arising from the defendants’ operation of a sham enterprise.  
“Establishing liability under [§ 1962(c)] of the RICO statute 
requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern 
(4) of racketeering activity, plus an injury to business or 
property.”  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 
269 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
Reyes must show that the racketeering activity was the 
“but for” cause as well as the proximate cause of the injury 
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purportedly suffered by the members of the proposed class.  
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 
(1992).  Proximate cause requires “some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged.”  Id. 
 
Accordingly, we must determine if Reyes produced 
sufficient evidence to show that he could prove his RICO 
claim based on facts or evidence common to the class, and 
whether such proof predominates over facts and 
circumstances that are particular to given individuals within 
the proposed class. 
 
The District Court concluded that Reyes established 
neither but-for cause, nor proximate cause because “Reyes 
would not be able to establish there was an impact that 
affected each class member in the same way.”  Reyes, 2013 
WL 5332107, at *8.  In reaching that conclusion, the District 
Court focused on the fact that potential class “[m]embers 
were contacted by telemarketers through different mediums 
about different products, and some, according to Reyes, were 
not contacted at all because the telemarketers bought their 
account information from other telemarketers.”  Id. 
 
We must determine whether the District Court (1) 
applied the proper standard for assessing predominance and 
commonality, (2) appropriately reviewed Reyes’ experts’ 
opinions and the other evidence on the record, and (3) 
properly determined that commonality and predominance 
were not established based on the evidence presented.  Much 
of our inquiry is guided by our analysis in In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litigation. 
 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In reviewing a denial of class certification, we subject 
the District Court’s legal rulings to de novo review.  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 312; see also 
In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 
We review the District Court’s findings of fact, its 
application of law to facts, and its decision regarding class 
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certification for an abuse of discretion.  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 312, 320 (citations 
omitted).  “The district court abused its discretion if its 
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Newton, 259 F.3d at 165-66 (footnote and quotation 
marks omitted).  “To illustrate . . . using the example of 
numerosity, review of the factual finding as to the size of the 
proposed class would be for clear error, review of the judge’s 
articulation of the legal standard governing numerosity would 
be de novo, and review of the ultimate ruling that applied the 
correct legal standard to the facts as found would be for abuse 
of discretion.”  In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 
F.3d at 41. 
 
B. RULE 23 LEGAL STANDARDS 
 
“Class certification is proper only if the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of 
Rule 23 are met.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d at 309 (footnote and quotation marks omitted).  In 
conducting its inquiry, a district court must rigorously assess 
“the available evidence and the method or methods by which 
plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove impact at 
trial.”  Id. at 312 (citations omitted); see also Comcast Corp. 
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (“[T]he court’s duty 
[is] to take a ‘close look’ at whether common questions 
predominate over individual ones.” (quoting Amchem 
Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 615).  On appeal, we do not 
“speculate as to what the District Court must have intended 
[regarding a Rule 23 requirement].  We cannot just assume 
the District Court conducted the appropriate analysis under 
Rule 23.  ‘Rigorous analysis’ requires more of the District 
Court than that[.]”  Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, --- 
F.3d ---, Civ. Action No. 14-1540, 2015 WL 4466919, at *15 
(3d Cir. July 22, 2015). 
 
We have also explained that the Rule 23 inquiry may 
require the district court to “delve” behind the pleadings.  In 
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 316 
(quotation marks omitted).  This means that, at the 
certification stage, the district court “cannot be bashful.  It 
must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class 
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certification, even if they overlap with the merits—including 
disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.”  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Without this searching inquiry, a district court cannot 
determine if class certification is appropriate.  Certification 
“calls for findings by the court, not merely a ‘threshold 
showing’ by a party, that each requirement of Rule 23 is met.  
Factual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be 
made by a preponderance of the evidence.”  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 307. 
 
1. Reyes’ Burden of Proof 
 
The District Court imposed a burden of absolute proof 
on Reyes at the certification stage.  Reyes now correctly 
argues that “the ‘absolute proof of fraud’ standard . . . 
exceeds this Court’s holding that factual issues bearing on the 
class certification ‘must be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence.’”  Appellant Br. at 35 (quoting In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 320). 
 
The District Court realized that “[t]o obtain class 
certification, a plaintiff must demonstrate the proposed class 
satisfies all four elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a), along with one of the three requirements under Rule 
23(b)[,]” and that “the court’s findings as to the Rule 23 
requirements must be supported by factual determinations 
made by a preponderance of the evidence[.]”  Reyes, 2013 
WL 5332107, at *3 (citations omitted).  However, the District 
Court’s analysis suffered from the same malady that troubled 
us in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation.  “[S]ome 
statements in [the District Court’s] opinion depart from the 
standards we have articulated.”  552 F.3d at 321.  The District 
Court stated the correct standard but misunderstood the 
burden of proof placed on a plaintiff seeking class 
certification.   
 
In concluding that there was insufficient commonality, 
the District Court relied on the fact that “Reyes’s experts have 
[not] testified that the return rates are . . . absolute proof of 
fraud[.]”  Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *8.  The District Court 
also believed that proof must be so persuasive that the 
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certifying court “cannot have any doubt as to whether the 
Rule 23 requirements are met.”  Id. at *7. 
 
The fact that the District Court imposed a burden of 
absolute proof is illustrated by the following statement: “since 
Reyes’s experts have testified that the return rates are only 
‘red flags’ of fraud and not absolute proof of fraud, the 
factfinder would have to analyze each telemarketer separately 
to determine whether or not it is a complete sham.”  Id. at *8 
(emphasis added).  The District Court also stated that it “must 
assess how Reyes will use the evidence at trial to prove 
impact on a classwide basis, and the Court cannot have any 
doubt as to whether the Rule 23 requirements are met.”  Id. at 
*7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation requires 
that a district court “not suppress doubt as to whether a Rule 
23 requirement is met[.]”  552 F.3d at 321 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  While a district court must consider how the 
evidence will be used at trial, id. at 311 & n.8, the plaintiff’s 
burden is not proof beyond “any doubt” as the District Court 
required, but whether the claims are supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 320. 
 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that “it 
is possible that not every telemarketer named in the Amended 
Complaint is a complete sham.”  Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at 
*7.  However, the standard is not whether it is mathematically 
or scientifically possible that one of these telemarketers is not 
a complete sham.  Rather, Reyes must establish that it is more 
likely than not that each of the telemarketers and the 
defendants operated a complete sham as alleged.  Reyes 
“must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance” with Rule 
23, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551, and “satisfy 
[the trial court] through evidentiary proof [of] at least one of 
the provisions of Rule 23(b).”  Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 
1432; see also Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  However, “the Rules and our case law have 
consistently made clear that plaintiffs need not actually 
establish the validity of claims at the certification stage.”  
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 306 (footnote omitted). 
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Here, as in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litigation, in remanding this matter to the District Court, we 
“recognize that the able District Court did not have the 
benefit of the standards we have articulated.”  552 F.3d at 
322.  Nevertheless, it is now clear that the District Court must 
(1) conduct rigorous analysis, (2) review all avenues of 
inquiry in which it may have doubts (even if it requires 
reviewing the merits) in order to (3) be satisfied and (4) make 
a definitive determination on the requirements of Rule 23, or 
even (5) require that a plaintiff demonstrate actual, not 
presumed conformance with Rule 23 requirements.  We 
stress, however, that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard governs.  The perfection of proof that the District 
Court demanded here is simply not required.  Moreover, it is 
important for the District Court to remember that an inability 
to calculate damages on a classwide basis will not, on its own, 
bar certification.  Neale, 2015 WL 4466919, at *17 & n.10 
(collecting cases).  A district court errs when it holds a 
plaintiff seeking class certification to a higher standard of 
proof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
remand is thus appropriate.  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 322 (“To the extent that the 
District Court’s analysis reflects application of incorrect 
standards, remand is appropriate.”). 
 
2. Evidence of Commonality and Predominance 
 
It is often appropriate to discuss commonality and 
predominance together because the commonality inquiry is 
subsumed into the predominance inquiry.  See, e.g., Danvers 
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[W]here an action is to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the commonality requirement is subsumed by the 
predominance requirement.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  We have also concluded that “[r]eading the 
District Court’s commonality and predominance analyses 
together . . .  is appropriate in [the RICO] context[.]”  In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 266-67 (citation 
omitted).  
 
Therefore, we do not fault the District Court for 
combining its discussions of commonality and predominance.  
Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *5-9.  However, in the interest 
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of clarity, we will address each requirement separately.  We 
will first discuss commonality, and then discuss 
predominance.  In re LifeUSA Holding, Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 
145 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[C]ommon questions (commonality) 
must be established before predominance can be found . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); see generally Marcus, 687 F.3d at 597, 
600-12. 
 
a. Commonality 
 
As explained above in relation to the different return 
rates, the District Court concluded that because Reyes’ 
evidence “result[s] in individual inquiries as to each 
telemarketer,” class certification is precluded.  Reyes, 2013 
WL 5332107, at *8.  The focus of the District Court’s inquiry 
was whether the proposed class would “generat[e] common 
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation, such that 
a determination of the truth or falsity of the contention will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 
the claims in one stroke.”  Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) merely 
requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class[.]”  Commonality does not require perfect identity of 
questions of law or fact among all class members.  Rather, 
“even a single common question will do.”  Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (quotation marks and alterations 
omitted); Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(discussing how Rule 23(a)(2) “is easily met[]”).  “A putative 
class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement if the 
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with 
the grievances of the prospective class.”  Rodriguez v. Nat’l 
City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A court’s focus must be “on 
whether the defendant’s conduct [is] common as to all of the 
class members[.]”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 298.  “Again, th[e] 
bar is not a high one.”  Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 382. 
 
When a party seeks to certify a class to bring a RICO 
claim, the focus is on the defendant’s conduct.  As we said in 
In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation: 
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[p]roving the first element of a RICO violation 
in this case would involve common questions 
about the activities of the . . . Defendants and, in 
particular, whether the . . . Defendants 
participated or engaged in conduct with other . . 
. Defendants.  The second element also involves 
common questions of law and fact, namely 
whether an enterprise of . . . Defendants existed 
. . . either as an association in fact or as a more 
formal organization or entity.  Proving the third 
and fourth elements would encompass common 
questions of law and fact as well, including 
whether activities that constitute racketeering 
were taking place through the enterprise (such 
as mail or wire fraud) and whether these 
racketeering activities were recurring such that 
a pattern could be established. 
 
 
579 F.3d at 269-70 (emphasis added).  These elements focus 
on the defendants’ joint conduct vis-à-vis the plaintiffs.  
Likewise, the District Court in this case noted that “the first 
four elements of a RICO claim . . . focus[] on the defendants’ 
conduct and the effect of that conduct.”  Reyes, 2013 WL 
5332107, at *5 (citation omitted).  Thus, a properly supported 
RICO allegation will often contain common issues because, 
like “commonality[, a RICO allegation,] is informed by the 
defendant’s conduct as to all class members and any resulting 
injuries common to all class members[.]”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d 
at 297; see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 
at 269-70.  “Whether the evidence presented proves a RICO 
conspiracy[]” is a question “common to each class member 
and will generate common answers[.]”  In re Cmty. Bank of 
N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 2015 WL 4547042, at 
*13-14. 
 
We also note that the elements of a RICO claim fit 
Wal-Mart’s commonality requirement because determining 
the “truth or falsity” of a “common contention[,]” here an 
element of RICO, “will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”  Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551; see In re Cmty. Bank of N. 
Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 2015 WL 4547042, at 
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*13 (distinguishing a putative RICO class action from the 
pitfalls of the class action rejected in Wal-Mart). 
 
Reyes has presented evidence which, if accepted, 
could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) 
“Zions and Modern Payments were processing transactions 
for a number of entities -- in addition to NHS Systems -- that 
government agencies [later] determined were fraudulent[,]” 
Appellant Br. at 15; Appellee Br. at 48-49, (2) Zions Bank, 
Netdeposit, and Modern Payments sent e-mails 
communicating a sense of shock regarding the “staggering” 
return rates, JA 686, and concerns that they may be at risk for 
some of their business lines being used for “money 
laundering[,]” id. at 692, (3) Zions Bank was aware that its 
high return rates “alarm[ed]” NACHA,” id. at 814-15, and (4) 
Modern Payments was “afraid of” a probe by the FTC 
regarding potential fraud, id. at 693, and Zions Bank received 
warnings from other banks that they “will disput[e] all 
charges” generated by NHS Systems.  Id. at 1061-62.  On 
remand, the District Court should consider whether this 
evidence, if accepted as credible, is sufficient to conclude that 
there is “actual, not presumed, conformance” with Rule 23.  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (requiring “[a] party 
seeking class certification [to] affirmatively demonstrate” 
compliance with Rule 23). 
 
We are not persuaded that the evidence here is similar 
to that which was deemed insufficient for class certification in 
Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart affirmed that commonality can be 
satisfied when there is “significant proof” that the defendant 
“operated under a general policy of discrimination.”  Id. at 
2553-54 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Wal-Mart, the defendant operated in a discretionary, 
and thus arguably individualized way toward the members of 
the proposed class.  The record did not establish a national 
policy or any single individual or group of individuals 
responsible for the exercise of discretion. 
 
Here, there are slight variations in the telemarketers’ 
and defendants’ conduct underlying the putative class 
members’ claims.  For example, some plaintiffs were offered 
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government grants, while others were offered healthcare 
discount cards, and still others had no direct involvement at 
all as their account information was purchased by a 
defendant.  However, unlike Wal-Mart, we are not concerned 
with damages that result from the exercise of anyone’s 
discretion. 
 
Further, in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs’ statistical and 
anecdotal evidence failed to demonstrate a “common mode of 
exercising discretion that pervades the entire company[.]”  Id. 
at 2554-55.  Without that, commonality could not be 
established. 
 
In stark contrast, the sham theory used here relies on a 
“common mode” of behavior and a “general policy” of fraud.  
See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices 
Litig., 2015 WL 4547042, at *13 (distinguishing Wal-Mart 
and reasoning that “the Plaintiffs in this case have alleged that 
the class was subjected to the same kind of illegal conduct by 
the same entities, and that class members were harmed in the 
same way, albeit to potentially different extents[]”). 
 
Reyes alleges that the defendants operated together in 
a common, fraudulent scheme that was a complete sham 
masquerading as a legitimate business undertaking.  When a 
plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s disputed conduct is a 
complete sham, the relevant inquiry is whether there was an 
ongoing scheme to defraud or deceive, Rosario, 963 F.2d at 
1017-19, and whether the defendant fails to meet the most 
basic standard of its purported commercial undertaking, 
Cullen, 188 F.R.D. at  235.  If so, a common harm will be 
presumed from the mere fact that class members were all 
similarly injured by the sham.  A court can then conclude that 
there are common issues and that those common issues will 
predominate over individual issues.15 
 
When viewed at this macroscopic level, rather than the 
microscopic level that may be required when allegations 
implicate a defendant’s exercise of discretion, it is clear that 
we are not faced with the individual circumstances that were 
                                              
15 Because the “complete sham” theory also applies to 
the predominance inquiry, it will be discussed further below. 
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fatal to certification in Wal-Mart.  As said, it is for the 
District Court to determine in the first instance whether Reyes 
has presented evidence that demonstrates commonality. 
 
b. Predominance 
 
Reyes also contends that the District Court erred in 
finding that class claims did not predominate over individual 
claims.  He argues that the District Court mistakenly focused 
on the return rates instead of considering that evidence in 
context with all of the testimony of his three experts, the FTC 
proceedings,16 and all other evidence that the defendants 
knew that they were operating a fraudulent enterprise. 
 
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests 
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”  Amchem Products, Inc., 521 
U.S. at 623 (citation omitted).  It is important to note that 
Reyes is alleging a kind of consumer fraud.  “[T]he Supreme 
Court has observed that predominance is a test readily met in 
certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or 
violations of the antitrust laws.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 321-22 (quotation marks 
omitted).  One relevant “guidepost[] that direct[s] the 
predominance inquiry[]” is “that commonality is informed by 
the defendant’s conduct as to all class members and any 
resulting injuries common to all class members[.]”  Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 297.  “[Wal-Mart v.] Dukes actually bolsters [this] 
position, making clear that the focus is on whether the 
defendant’s conduct was common as to all of the class 
members, not on whether each plaintiff has a ‘colorable’ 
claim.”  Id. at 299.  Rule 23 does not require the absence of 
all variations in a defendant’s conduct or the elimination of 
all individual circumstances.  Rather, predominance is 
satisfied if common issues predominate.  In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 162 (3d Cir. 2002).  “[T]he 
                                              
16 As noted supra note 8, the proceedings came after 
the defendants’ involvement here.  But, if admissible, it 
would be for the factfinder to determine if the record, taken as 
a whole, supports the conclusion (or an inference) that the 
defendants were aware of the facts underlying the 
proceedings, or the proceedings themselves. 
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focus of Rule 23(b)(3) is on the predominance of common 
questions[.]”  Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013) (emphasis in original).  
A district court “analyze[s] predominance in the context of 
Plaintiffs’ actual claims.”  Neale, 2015 WL 4466919, at *14. 
 
When Rule 23 is the mechanism to redress alleged 
RICO violations, predominance and commonality are 
satisfied if each element of the alleged RICO violation 
involves common questions of law and fact capable of proof 
by evidence common to the class.  In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 269-70.  This is true even if 
“establishing an injury is not as conducive to common 
proof[,]” so long as a court is “satisfied that the plaintiffs 
have presented a plausible theory for proving a class-wide 
injury as a result of the racketeering activities of the alleged 
enterprises at issue[.]”  Id. at 270; see also Neale, 2015 WL 
4466919, at *17 & n.10 (collecting cases regarding how an 
inability to calculate damages on a classwide basis will not, 
on its own, bar certification).  “The question is not what valid 
claims can plaintiffs assert; rather, it is simply whether 
common issues of fact or law predominate.”  Sullivan, 667 
F.3d at 305 (citation omitted); In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 311-12. 
 
The predominance inquiry seeks to resolve whether 
there are “reliable means of proving classwide injury[.]”  In 
re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 
252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also In re Nexium Antitrust 
Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2015).  This is often done with 
the assistance of experts. 
 
The District Court relied on Johnston v. HBO Film 
Management, Incorporated, 265 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir. 
2001), and In re LifeUSA Holding, Incorporated, 242 F.3d 
136, 146 (3d Cir. 2001), to conclude that, because these 
“telemarketers . . . interacted with consumers in different 
ways (by telephone, internet, and slamming),” Reyes, 2013 
WL 5332107, at *7, and because return rates are not absolute 
proof that the defendants are a complete sham, “the only way 
to determine if a class member was defrauded was to 
individually examine the interaction between the defendant 
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and each class member.”  Id. at *6.  Neither case persuades 
us. 
 
In In re LifeUSA Holding, Incorporated, the fraud 
involved a product that “was not sold according to standard, 
uniform, scripted sales presentations.”  242 F.3d at 146.  We 
concluded that simply focusing on whether all potential class 
members were misled by the same product was inappropriate.  
Id.  We also stated that when “the record is uncompromising 
in revealing non-standardized and individualized sales 
‘pitches’ presented by independent and different sales agents, 
all subject to varying defenses and differing state laws, . . . 
certification of individualized issues [is] inappropriate.”  Id. 
at 147; cf. Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1255 
(2d Cir. 2002) (“[M]aterial uniformity in the 
misrepresentations may be established without the use of a 
standardized sales script[, for example.]”).   
 
In Johnston, we again held that oral misrepresentation 
must be uniform in order to establish predominance under 
Rule 23(b)(3).  See 265 F.3d at 190.  Thus, “it has become 
well-settled that, as a general rule, an action based 
substantially on oral rather than written communications is 
inappropriate for treatment as a class action.”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
However, both of those cases involved legitimate 
businesses and Reyes relies upon that to distinguish the 
circumstances here, arguing instead that the defendants and 
telemarketers here were not legitimate business entities.  See 
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 
2015 WL 4547042, at *19, *21 (affirming the District Court’s 
finding that individual issues of reliance will not predominate 
when the plaintiffs “allege[] that [the defendant] performed 
absolutely no services to earn the . . . fees[]”).  Rather, Reyes 
asserts that they all acted in concert to perpetrate fraud 
through a sham enterprise and that each of the defendants had 
to have known the real nature of that fraudulent enterprise.  
He also claims that any variations in the manner in which 
various individuals were defrauded is irrelevant and not 
sufficient to preclude common issues of law from 
predominating.  The argument is based on his claim that the 
defendants “engaged in systematic fraud and operated solely 
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to debit victims’ accounts[]” and “there is no evidence of any 
cohort of class members who were not victims.”  Appellant 
Br. at 64. 
 
Likewise, in Cullen, plaintiffs claimed that, while the 
“defendants represented that they were providing a program 
that would prepare students for careers as ultrasound 
sonographers[,]” they “misrepresent[ed] the nature of the 
ultrasound program, and failed to provide the education 
represented.”  188 F.R.D. at 228.  Even though the institution 
was accredited, the program that the plaintiffs were enrolled 
in was not.  That prevented the program’s graduates from 
sitting for the relevant registration examination.  Id. at 228-
29.  The plaintiffs contended that the “defendants’ operation 
was a ‘complete sham,’ and did not provide even a minimal 
education.”  Id. at 228.  Cullen held that the sham theory 
satisfied the predominance requirement and it certified a 
RICO class.  Cullen explained: “plaintiffs’ proof will be 
focused on the defendants’ conduct; plaintiffs’ case will 
revolve around evidence that the school did not meet the most 
basic standards of an educational program.  It need not 
involve time consuming proof of individual causation or 
reliance.”  Id. at 235.  Instead, at trial, “[i]f the plaintiffs can 
prove that [the defendant] was a complete sham, then a fact 
finder can infer from the evidence that anyone who paid 
tuition and attended the school suffered damage.”  Id. 
 
Cullen relied on Rosario, which had similar facts and 
involved a similar fraudulent scheme.  The trial evidence in 
Rosario established that the defendant failed to provide 
students with the skills, equipment, or environment to prepare 
for a cosmetology career for which the school was supposed 
to train students.  Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1016-17.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
certification of the class.  It held that the operative question 
was whether the “schools operated pursuant to an ongoing 
scheme to defraud and deceive prospective students[,]” thus 
applying a “complete sham” theory.  Id. at 1018.  The 
defendants attempted to negate that approach by relying on 
evidence that some students were satisfied with their 
education and two students who graduated did become 
licensed and were working in the field.  The Seventh Circuit 
refused to conclude that the defendant-institution was not a 
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complete sham merely because “some class members were 
satisfied with their teachers, and at least two class members 
graduated from [the defendant’s] schools and passed the state 
licensing exam.”  Id. at 1017.  Rather, the Court concluded 
that “[t]he fact that there is some factual variation among the 
class grievances will not defeat a class action.”  Id. at 1017-18 
(citation omitted). 
 
While the District Court here recognized Reyes’ theory 
of a sham enterprise, it nevertheless concluded that the 
evidence Reyes offered in support of that theory was 
insufficient to satisfy predominance because different sales 
pitches were used and different products were pitched.  
However, if absolute conformity of conduct and harm were 
required for class certification, unscrupulous businesses could 
victimize consumers with impunity merely by tweaking the 
language in a telemarketing script or directing some (or all) of 
the telemarketers not to use a script at all but to simply orally 
convey a general theme designed to get access to personal 
information such as account numbers. 
 
We do not believe that our discussion of predominance 
in our prior cases intended to either license such behavior by 
placing it beyond the reach of Rule 23 or to supply a roadmap 
that would guide the unscrupulous in designing fraudulent 
schemes that would be beyond the reach of Rule 23.  
Otherwise, although such subtle but irrelevant variations in 
the manner of defrauding members of the public would not 
insulate unscrupulous marketers from liability in individual 
suits, it would -- for all practical purposes -- insulate them 
from class actions.  An interpretation of Rule 23 that places 
class actions beyond the reach of consumers who have been 
victimized by fraudulent schemers who are wise enough to 
adopt schemes with subtle (but meaningless) variations would 
invite the kind of consumer fraud that Reyes is alleging here. 
 
Class actions are often the only practical check against 
the kind of widespread mass-marketing scheme alleged here.  
The individual claims arising from such conduct are usually 
too small to justify suit unless aggregated in a class action.  
This is particularly true when, as is often the case, the scheme 
targets unsophisticated consumers with little disposable 
income and without the means or wherewithal to seek 
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assistance of legal counsel.  As a practical matter, the average 
victim of such a scheme nearly always finds it far easier -- 
and much cheaper -- to reluctantly accept any loss and move 
on than to undertake the expense and inconvenience endemic 
in the protracted process of trying to recover a few dollars 
years later. 
 
A class action “permit[s] the plaintiffs to pool claims 
which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.  . . .  
[M]ost of [such] plaintiffs would have no realistic day in 
court if a class action were not available.”  Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).  “[C]onsumers have 
little interest in litigating their claims individually because of 
the small amount of money per plaintiff that is at stake.”  
Cabraser, supra, at 822 (quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, obtaining counsel to pursue such a claim is usually 
the height of impracticality -- even for those who can afford 
to do so.  “What rational lawyer would have signed on to 
represent the [party] in litigation for the possibility of fees 
stemming from a $30.22 claim?”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 
In such cases, the class action can “create[] greater 
access to judicial relief[.]”  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594.  “[I]t is[, 
in fact,] possible to think of consumer class actions as 
providing an indispensable mechanism for aggregating claims 
when the individual stake is low and the similarity of the 
challenged conduct is high.”  Samuel Issacharoff, Group 
Litig. of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience, 34 Tex. Int’l L.J. 135, 149 (1999).17  Thus, class 
actions have the practical effect of allowing plaintiffs who 
have suffered relatively de minimis loss to nevertheless 
function as private attorneys general and thereby deter fraud 
in the marketplace. 
                                              
17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 
the 1966 amendment (“[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous 
persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an 
appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so 
despite the need, if liability is found, for separate 
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within 
the class.”). 
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The “complete sham” theory, if supported by an 
appropriate record, can satisfy the predominance prong of 
Rule 23(b)(3) by focusing on the overarching material and 
defining aspects of a defendant’s conduct.  This allows a 
court to certify a class despite subtle (but meaningless) 
variations that may occur while perpetrating a fraudulent 
scheme.  Thus, as Reyes contends “[u]ltimately, the question 
is the extent to which fraud can be shown to have been 
committed on the class by common evidence.”  Appellant Br. 
at 64.  On remand, the District Court should consider the 
entire record to determine if it supports that contention. 
 
Investigator Blake testified “each of the schemes at 
issue was a totally fraudulent mass-marketing fraud.”  Blake 
Decl., JA 1613, ¶ 15.  She concluded that these were all 
“precisely the kind of fundamentally fraudulent schemes that, 
in [her] experience, have been routinely adjudicated on the 
basis of common evidence of fraud.” Id., JA 1627-28, ¶ 85.  
Professor Meyer reviewed the evidence and concluded that 
the proof of fraud was classwide.  He identified four key 
features common to the way each telemarketer obtained bank 
account information and initiated debits from bank accounts.  
He concluded that although “these ‘products and programs’ 
appear to vary, all had [those] four common features essential 
to their use as props in the scheme of deception[.]”  Meyer 
Decl., JA 1639-40 ¶ 19.  The court-appointed receiver for 
NHS Systems, Geisser, testified that NHS Systems was 
“totally fraudulent and that no consumer who . . . had money 
taken from their account was not injured in the amount of 
money taken from their account[.]”  Geisser Dep., JA 1161. 
 
The District Court may consider that the defendants’ 
experts offer little reason to conclude that predominance 
cannot be satisfied here.  As noted above, Milner testified for 
the defendant.  Milner did not agree that a return rate in 
excess of 10% was prima facie evidence of fraud.  However, 
she also explained that pursuant to its Operating Rules, 
“NACHA gathers specific information concerning individual 
Originators with high rates of unauthorized returns . . . [and] 
may send the bank of an originator producing unauthorized 
returns in excess of 1% a written request for information 
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about specific originators.”  Milner Decl., JA 3787, ¶ 25 
(citation and footnote omitted). 
 
Professor Boss testified that “the overwhelming 
majority of banks in the United States have no unauthorized 
returns at all . . . .”  Boss Decl., JA 590 ¶ 82.  Reyes focuses 
our attention on testimony that Zions Bank, like most U.S. 
banks, had no unauthorized returns in August of 2006.  It then 
started working with its wholly-owned subsidiary, Modern 
Payments, and its unauthorized returns began to “immediately 
. . . increase dramatically from zero in August 2006 to 799 in 
October, [and] 2,095 to 2,632 by February 2007.”  Id., JA 
587-88 ¶ 78 (emphasis in original).  As noted earlier, when 
adjusted for its size, Zions Bank had the highest rate of 
returns of any U.S. bank.  
 
Reyes also offers the following chart summarizing the 
evidence regarding the return rates of the telemarketers: 
 
NHS 64.79% 51.90% 15
RX Smart 54.21% 42.00% 3
Market Power Entities
Market Power 86.73% 85.10% 11
Payday loan 73.46% 70.98% 4
Get Your Credit Rept 62.48% 55.94% 4
Vexeldale 74.09% 70.52% 4
Platinum Benefit Group 30.83% 37.98% 39
Group 1 Entities 51.67% 65.41% 21
Low Pay Inc 68.83% 65.41% 10
* JA 661 ** JA 663
41
55
Total Return Rates
Return Rate as a 
Multiple of 2007 
National Average 
(1.25%)**
52
43
69
59
50
59
25
Fraud Scheme
Average 
Return 
Rate*
First 
Month 
Return 
Rate*
Total 
Months 
With 
Zions*
 
 
Appellant Br. at 25 (footnote omitted).18 
                                              
18 We are not, of course, suggesting that the District 
Court had to accept the conclusions in the chart or the expert 
testimony that the scheme here is susceptible to class 
treatment.  That determination remains left to the sound 
discretion of the District Court.  However, the District Court 
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The crux of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry 
here is whether a preponderance of the evidence supports 
Reyes’ proposition that the defendants operated a complete 
sham, and whether an affirmative answer to that inquiry 
would establish the required element of predominance.  Reyes 
claims that if the evidence supports such a finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied, even though the 
telemarketers did not read from a uniform script or use the 
same method of defrauding each of the members of the 
putative class.  Appellant Br. at 62-63 (distinguishing this 
case from In re LifeUSA Holding, Incorporated and Johnston 
because there is a “question about the legitimacy of the 
[entity] itself[]” in which Reyes alleges the existence of one 
“systematic fraud”).   
 
As we have reiterated, Reyes argues the District Court 
erred in relying only on high return rates to deny class 
certification.  As detailed above, Reyes also introduced proof 
of the structure of each of the schemes and FTC 
investigations.  In particular, Reyes points to “broader 
eviden[ce] . . . includ[ing] three experts (all of whom opined 
that the underlying mass-marketing schemes were completely 
fraudulent), the related government proceedings, Mr. 
Geisser’s testimony, and a wealth of documentary evidence 
and deposition testimony reflecting Defendants’ knowledge 
of the fraud they were furthering.”  Id. at 54.19  According to 
                                                                                                     
is not free to simply ignore such testimony without explaining 
why it is rejecting it.  That is the antithesis of the thorough 
and rigorous inquiry that the law demands at the certification 
stage. 
 
19 See also Appellant Reply Br. at 9-12 (discussing 
additional evidence, including “internal bank documents 
showing that Defendants were aware that they were providing 
services to frauds,” warnings from regulators, other banks, 
and employees “directly inform[ing] [the defendants] that 
they were carrying out transactions for frauds[,]” expert 
testimony, testimony from Geisser, “documents and 
declarations from both regulatory actions that identified each 
of the mass-marketing entities as frauds and those that 
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Reyes, the “evidence [presented about the fraudulent 
companies] applies to the class as a whole, [therefore] the 
jury’s consideration of th[e] evidence would apply to each 
class member’s claim.”  Id. at 37.  If accepted, the District 
Court may conclude that this evidence supports a finding that 
there was a single fraudulent RICO enterprise, that each 
defendant participated in that enterprise, and that all members 
of the proposed class were damaged in the amount of the 
funds debited from their bank accounts pursuant to the 
fraudulent scheme.  We leave it for the District Court to 
assess this on remand. 
 
Reyes further asserts that the District Court could have 
specified subclasses for each defendant if it were concerned 
about proving fraud with respect to each entity.  Id.; 
Appellant Reply Br. at 6 n.4.  On remand, to the extent that 
                                                                                                     
ordered complete restitution of their victims[,]” data 
demonstrating the “explo[sion]” of unauthorized returns 
following the formation of the alleged RICO enterprise, and 
“documents showing that Defendants closely monitored the 
entities’ extreme return rates—which they openly 
acknowledged were staggering[.]” (citations and quotation 
marks omitted)). 
In mentioning this evidence, we in no way suggest that 
we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that evidence of 
high return rates cannot establish fraud on this record.  We 
refrain from concluding that return rates can never be prima 
facie evidence of fraud or knowledge of fraud, no matter how 
much they vary from industry norms.  See Blake Decl., JA 
1612-13 ¶ 14.d (“The schemes at issue here involve unusually 
high numbers of returns even compared to other fraudulent 
schemes I have investigated.  It is therefore highly likely that 
most of these schemes engaged in what is commonly known 
as ‘slamming.’”); Boss Decl., JA 587-88, 590 ¶¶ 78, 82 
(“Anyone in possession of the[] facts [about the return rates] 
would have to have known fraud was involved.  . . .  It is 
obvious that the high rates of unauthorized returns are 
indicative of fraudulent activity by these companies.”); Meyer 
Decl., JA 1637-38 ¶¶ 12.a, 14 (“For there to be such high 
return rates there had to be fraud involved.  . . .  I conclude 
with reasonable certainty that the return rates alone establish 
that each of the entities at issue was fraudulent.”). 
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the District Court is concerned with the commonality and 
predominance requirements because of variations in the way 
the affairs of the allegedly fraudulent enterprise was 
conducted, it can consider whether Reyes’ proposed 
subclasses would adequately address those concerns.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(5), (d); see also Neale, 2015 WL 4466919, at 
*15 (“[T]he District Court should evaluate the relevant claims 
(grouping them where logical and appropriate) and rule on the 
predominance [and commonality] question[s] in light of the 
claims asserted and the available evidence.” (citation 
omitted)); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class 
Certification, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1897, 1898 (2014) 
(“[D]istrict courts sometimes exercise discretion in defining 
the parameters of the class definition and deciding when 
subclasses are necessary, often acting independently of any 
proposals made by the parties.” (footnote omitted)).20  We 
note, however, “[t]he court has no sua sponte obligation so to 
act.”  U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 
(1980).  “[I]t is not the District Court that is to bear the 
burden of constructing subclasses.  That burden is upon the 
[plaintiff] . . . who is required to submit proposals to the 
court.”  Id. 
 
As we have already explained, Reyes is correct in 
asserting that the District Court erred when it “examined one 
piece of evidence -- the mass-marketers’ extreme return rates 
-- and concluded that these rates alone were not ‘absolute 
proof’ of fraud.”  Appellant Br. at 37.  The law does not 
permit a district court to only consider and analyze the “most 
significant evidence[.]”  Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *2.  
Rather, the trial court must consider “all relevant evidence 
and arguments, including relevant expert testimony of the 
parties [unless there is a reason to reject certain testimony].”  
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 325 
(emphasis added); see also In re Blood Reagents Antitrust 
Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015).  Moreover, as we 
have also explained, we do not require “absolute proof.”  
Indeed, such a burden would be prohibitive, as few things are 
capable of absolute proof that removes all possibility of 
                                              
20 For a very thorough development of the evolution of 
discretion under Rule 23, see Wolff,  Discretion in Class 
Certification, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1911-39. 
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doubt.  Here, the District Court’s analysis singled out the 
“most significant evidence” (return rates) and then improperly 
applied a heightened standard to that evidence while ignoring 
all of the other testimony. 
 
However, there is an even more fundamental flaw in 
the District Court’s analysis.  The District Court relied on fact 
witnesses while ignoring expert testimony, and confused the 
testimony of the witnesses it did consider.21  As noted above, 
Reyes presented declarations from three expert witnesses: 
Professors Boss and Meyer, and Investigator Blake.  
However, the District Court failed to mention, let alone 
closely scrutinize, any of Reyes’ experts.  See Amchem 
Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 615-16 (referring to the trial 
court’s “close look” before finding predominance and 
superiority); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 553 
F.3d at 320 (“[A] district court errs as a matter of law when it 
fails to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute relevant to 
determining the requirements.”).  The District Court then 
referred to Geisser and Fox as Reyes’ expert witnesses.  
Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *7.  Geisser and Fox were not 
expert witnesses, but fact witnesses.  Geisser was installed as 
the NHS Systems receiver after the FTC obtained a 
preliminary injunction against NHS Systems; Fox was a 
senior director of risk investigation at NACHA.  Appellant 
Br. at 10, 12, 26. 
 
Perhaps because it confused their role and expertise, 
the District Court relied on a concession by the fact witnesses 
to justify limiting its analysis to evidence of high return rates.  
Reyes, 2013 WL 5332107, at *7 (relying on Geisser’s 
concession and Fox’s silence to conclude that the high return 
rates are not dispositive of fraud).  However, not only did 
Reyes’ expert witnesses fail to make this concession, Blake 
Decl., JA 1612-13 ¶ 14.d; Boss Decl., JA 587-88, 590 ¶¶ 78, 
82; Meyer Decl., JA 1637-38 ¶¶ 12.a, 14, they also based 
their conclusions on the additional evidence discussed above. 
 
                                              
21 Much of the confusion here is understandable.  The 
District Court inherited the rather voluminous record in this 
case from another judge. 
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The defendants correctly remind us that “[d]istrict 
courts are not required under Hydrogen Peroxide, or any 
other authority, to cite specifically to the declarations of every 
expert or every other piece of evidence relevant to class 
certification merely to prove that they were considered in its 
rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements.”  Appellee Br. 
at 32-33 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  That is 
undoubtedly true.  However, a “rigorous analysis” is 
nevertheless mandated, and the defendants do not contest 
that. 
 
Quite obviously, an analysis of testimony that refers to 
individuals as expert witnesses when they are merely fact 
witnesses and confuses one party’s fact witnesses with 
experts, while not correctly citing any expert testimony, is 
inconsistent with the demanding scrutiny required under Rule 
23.  “[T]he court’s obligation to consider all relevant 
evidence and arguments extends to expert testimony, whether 
offered by a party seeking class certification or by a party 
opposing it.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 
F.3d at 307 (emphasis added). 
 
We have not required a district court to refer to, or cite, 
every expert that either party presents and we do not do so 
now.22  Rather, we merely apply the holding of In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation: “[T]he district court 
must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary 
and must consider all relevant evidence and arguments 
presented by the parties.”  552 F.3d at 307 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).23 
 
The defendants argue that the District Court’s 
mistaken reference to fact witnesses as Reyes’ experts did not 
                                              
22 See, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 603 (failing to 
interpret In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation as 
requiring a district court to explicitly discuss every expert 
opinion). 
 
23 As we have explained above, In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litigation merely “emphasize[s] the need 
for a careful, fact-based approach, informed, if necessary, by 
discovery.”  552 F.3d at 326. 
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result in an abuse of discretion because the District Court 
addressed the key arguments that each of Reyes’ experts 
made.  This record belies that argument.  The District Court 
merely focused on high return rates, without more.  Reyes, 
2013 WL 5332107, at *7-8.  Not only did the District Court 
minimize the probative value of that evidence by requiring 
absolute proof of fraud, thereby undermining its relevance to 
the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), it also 
failed to confront Reyes’ experts’ arguments on the 
importance of the return rates.  See, e.g., Boss Decl., JA 582-
92 ¶¶ 66-87; Meyer Decl., JA 1637-38 ¶ 12.b.  Further, as 
discussed above, the District Court failed to confront Reyes’ 
experts’ arguments of “clear indications of fraud[]” based on 
more than return rates.  Boss Decl., JA 587 ¶ 77.  See, e.g., 
Blake Decl., JA 1613 ¶ 15; Boss Decl., JA 592 ¶ 87; Meyer 
Decl., JA 1639 ¶ 18.24 
 
A district court errs as a matter of law when it confuses 
testimony, as the District Court did here, and fails to carefully 
scrutinize the relevant, disputed testimony.25 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
order denying class certification and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
24 Amici remind us that Milner testified that 
“transactions may be returned to a merchant under 68 
different return codes, each of which has a different definition 
and covers different return scenarios.  None of these codes are 
defined to identity fraud.” American Bankers Ass’n & Indep. 
Cmty. Bankers of America Br. at 5.  That does not negate the 
force of the evidence of rate of return of each of the defendant 
merchants here.  It is fair to assume that similarly situated 
banks would generally have roughly equivalent return rates.  
Indeed the testimony here supports that assumption. 
 
25  We may have a different situation if the District 
Court quoted the expert witnesses, but mistakenly referred to 
them as fact witnesses.  That is not what happened. Here, we 
have the fact witnesses’ arguments and names, not the 
experts’. 
